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One Man, Six Votes, and Many
Unanswered Questions
CUMULATIVE VOTING AS A REMEDIAL MEASURE
FOR SECTION 2 VIOLATIONS IN PORT CHESTER
AND BEYOND
The nation looked on as voters cast up to six ballots for
their favorite candidates in the June 2010 local government
election in Port Chester, New York (the Village).1 For the first
time in the Village, voters exercised an ability to stack votes for
their preferred candidates—and a court-imposed remedial plan
made this electoral system possible. Four years before, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a claim seeking to remedy
what it perceived to be impermissible voting practices that led
to the dilution of Hispanic votes within the Village.2 After
litigation in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York, the DOJ prevailed in its claim against
the Village.3 The court ordered that a new plan be employed to
rectify past voting wrongs in Port Chester.4 Specifically, the
court ruled that Port Chester’s proposed plan for an alternative
system of voting, called cumulative voting, would be used.5
This type of DOJ enforcement action is certainly not
unique. The DOJ has filed a host of suits against jurisdictions
it perceives to be in violation of section 2 of the Voting Rights

1

Kirk Semple, First Latino Board Member Is Elected in Port Chester, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A27, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/
nyregion/17chester.html [hereinafter Semple, First Latino Board Member]; Kirk Semple,
Trying to Make History, With 6 Votes Per Person, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010, at A15,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/12/nyregion/12chester.html [hereinafter
Semple, Trying to Make History] (“federal officials, civil rights scholars and the village’s
political leadership” all watched the polls closely).
2
United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
2010); see also Semple, First Latino Board Member, supra note 1 (“A federal lawsuit filed
in 2006 by the Justice Department, charged that the village’s method of electing its
trustees diluted the voting strength of Latino citizens. A federal court judge agreed, and
in 2009 ordered the imposition of a rarely used process known as cumulative voting.”).
3
Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 453.

1669

1670

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:4

Act of 1965,6 with an aim of earning minority voters in targeted
jurisdictions fair representation.7 Section 2 is the crucial
provision under which the DOJ brings claims against political
subdivisions for vote-diluting practices. The section authorizes
the courts or the litigating parties to develop remedial measures
so that minority populations have the potential to elect their
preferred candidate.8 Although the DOJ objected to the Village’s
plan, it ultimately signed the consent decree after a court order,
which established the new cumulative voting system.9
The DOJ’s position regarding the implementation of
cumulative voting—or other alternative voting systems10—is
not new. Cumulative voting, a proportional system of
representative voting that is more commonly used in corporate
governance,11 has been implemented in dozens of jurisdictions
nationwide in recent years, often as a remedial measure in
settlement agreements for violations of the Voting Rights Act.12
6

42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
See Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS
DIV., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_2/about_sec2.php (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
8
See id.
9
Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 453.
10
Other alternative voting systems include “preference” or “choice” voting,
and “limited voting.” Choice voting is a “proportional voting system used in at-large or
multi-member district elections where voters rank candidates in order of preference.”
Limited voting is a “plurality-majority system used in multi-member districts; electors
have more than one vote but fewer votes than there are candidates to be
elected. . . . [T]he candidates with the highest vote totals win[] the seats.” See Glossary,
FAIRVOTE: THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/fvoglossary (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). This note focuses on cumulative voting, but the
DOJ has not readily approved these other alternative systems as remedial measures
for section 2 violations either.
11
See Robert Brischetto, Cumulative Voting at Work in Texas: A 1995 Exit
Survey of Sixteen Communities, FAIRVOTE: PROGRAM FOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT,
http://archive.fairvote.org/index.php?page=529 (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
12
See Richard Briffault, Electing Delegates to a State Constitutional
Convention: Some Legal and Policy Issues, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1125, 1147 (2005) (discussing
different settlement agreements adopting cumulative voting in section 2 lawsuits); Alec
Slatky, Debunking the Myths about Port Chester, FAIRVOTE: THE CENTER FOR VOTING
AND DEMOCRACY (June 25, 2010), http://www.fairvote.org/debunking-the-myths-aboutport-chester (last visited Mar. 12, 2011). Cumulative voting garnered interest and
attention after the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), and a
subsequent line of cases, which instructed that racial gerrymandering was a violation
of the Equal Protection Clause. Districts were left befuddled at how best to earn
minority populations a fair vote in elections without drawing territorial lines that were
impermissibly associated with race. See Steven J. Mulroy, The Way Out: A Legal
Standard for Imposing Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Remedies, 33
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 333, 348-49 (1998) [hereinafter Mulroy, The Way Out]
(explaining that the Shaw cases allowed for “less and less discretion for drawers of
redistricting plans to draw districts that provide minorities fair electoral opportunities
without running afoul of the Constitution”). The Shaw line of cases is discussed in
more detail infra Part I.B.
7
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Cumulative voting allows voters within a system to cast more
than one vote for a favored candidate. Each voter is typically
allotted as many ballots as the number of seats open in a given
election.13 However, while the DOJ has been a signatory on
consent decrees that effectually implement the system, it has
never specifically advocated for cumulative voting as a cure for
violations of the Act.14 Rather, the DOJ continues to push for
single-member districts that comprise majority-minority
populations as cures for defective, vote-dilutive procedures. The
DOJ’s failure to readily sanction cumulative voting as a remedy
for section 2 violations is problematic; it has led to public
misconception and confusion within political subdivisions about
how best to approach implementation of alternative voting
systems like cumulative voting. And, in the wake of a recent
Supreme Court decision,15 the DOJ’s refusal to identify
cumulative voting as a cure narrows still the availability of
potential remedies for section 2 violations.
This note seeks to understand why the DOJ is wary of
using cumulative voting to remedy violations of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act, and advocates that the DOJ provide clear
guidelines regarding the circumstances under which the
system should be used. While cumulative voting received
attention nearly fifteen years ago when single-member
districts16 were challenged on equal-protection grounds, the
public’s understanding of the system—and the DOJ’s stance on
using the system—has not become any clearer. But in the wake
of recent Supreme Court precedent, the fate of single-member
districts is again unclear at best.17 As such, it is necessary to
13

See Glossary, supra note 10.
See Steven J. Mulroy, When the U.S. Government Endorses Full
Representation: Justice Department Positions on Alternative Electoral Schemes,
FAIRVOTE: PROGRAM FOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, http://archive.fairvote.org/
?page=542 (last visited Mar. 6, 2011) [hereinafter Mulroy, Full Representation] (noting
that the DOJ has never “explicitly stated a policy regarding the appropriateness of
these electoral schemes, except to say that they may be appropriate in certain
circumstances to correct the problem of under-representation of minorities”).
15
See Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1249 (2009) (plurality opinion)
(holding that crossover districts will not satisfy a prima facie vote-dilution cause of
action under the first Gingles precondition and Section 2 and that the law does not
mandate that crossover districts be drawn).
16
A single-member district is “[a] district from which only one member is
elected.” See Glossary, supra note 10.
17
See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1254, 1258 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
the preclusion of crossover districts as embodying an “opportunity to elect” will require
political subdivisions to draw districts in accordance with race); see also Luis FuentesRohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands of a Conservative
Court, 5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & POL’Y 125, 126 (2010) (noting that “‘race-conscious
14
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revisit the possibility of implementing reasonable alternative
systems, and it is necessary for the DOJ to be more flexible in
its view of acceptable remedies for section 2 violations and
embrace alternative systems where appropriate. Neither the
DOJ nor the courts have provided sufficient guidance about
when these systems might be appropriate as remedial
measures. Indeed, scholars such as Steven J. Mulroy wrote
about the DOJ’s unclear stance regarding cumulative voting in
the 1990s, seeking to divine the circumstances under which the
DOJ would support alternative systems of voting.
Part I of this note provides an overview of the relevant
Voting Rights Act provisions and the system of cumulative
voting. Part II discusses a recent case, United States v. Village of
Port Chester,18 as a relevant example of contemporary litigation
and a model of the current implementation of cumulative voting.
Part III seeks to glean an understanding of the DOJ’s position
regarding cumulative voting. Part III also compares section 2
and section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, providing a snapshot of
cumulative voting in the history of the DOJ’s preclearance
system.19 Next, this part discusses potentially preclusive
precedent, along with a recent decision that, from a policy
perspective, should engender, but from a legal standpoint, might
jeopardize, the existence of cumulative voting as a section 2
remedy.20 Finally, Part IV proposes that the DOJ provide more
detailed information about the availability of alternative voting
schemes like cumulative voting for section 2 violations and
advocates that the DOJ pronounce the circumstances under
which the system may—or may not—be used.

redistricting and the creation of effective minority districts’ . . . . might soon become
quaint relics of an old and racist past,” and discussing the views of Justices Kennedy,
Thomas, Scalia, and Alito); Richard Pildes, The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority
Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1140 (2007) (“Far from a ringing endorsement of
the law of minority vote dilution, [League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC)
v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)] reveals a Court increasingly troubled by—indeed, more
and more resistant to—the very concept of minority vote dilution and the
accompanying legal requirement of ‘safe minority districting.’”).
18
704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
19
Under section 5, “covered jurisdictions” seek approval from the Attorney
General to change their voting systems to ensure they do not implement procedures that
would likely have retrogressive effects. See Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE: CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/about.php (last
visited Mar. 17, 2011).
20
E.g., Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231; Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986);
Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553 (8th Cir. 2010).
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RELEVANT VOTING RIGHTS ACT LEGAL HISTORY

Minority vote dilution litigation has a complex past.
Since the enactment of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, vote
dilution claims have generated difficult analyses for the courts.
As Justice O’Connor noted at the outset of one vote-dilution
case, the Court was faced with “two . . . most complex and
sensitive issues . . . : the meaning of the constitutional ‘right’ to
vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to
benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority
groups.”21 The issues facing the courts today are similar, but the
difficulty lies in a legislature’s ability to ensure proper ballot
access to the electorate under the framework of the law.
A.

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: A Brief
Summary

On August 6, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson signed
the Voting Rights Act into law.22 The Act’s passage “was an
important step in the struggle to end discriminatory treatment
of minorities who seek to exercise the most fundamental rights
of our citizens: the right to vote.”23 When it was passed, the
Voting Rights Act was controversial.24 Section 2 of the Act,
however, was not criticized, since it was largely identical to the
Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.25 In
relevant part, section 2 of the Voting Rights Act provides that
“[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied . . . in a
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or
color . . . .”26
21

Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT 235 (1973).
23
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1240.
24
Id.
25
The Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, “The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 61
(1980) (noting that section 2 was “intended to have an effect no different from that of
the Fifteenth Amendment itself”).
26
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). Section 2 originally prohibited practices
“imposed or applied by any state or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of
any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1970). When the Act was amended in 1982, the section dispensed with any kind of
22
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In 1986, in Thornburg v. Gingles,27 the Supreme Court
construed section 2 as amended for the first time, providing a set
of conditions to aid courts and potential plaintiffs in determining
the boundaries of a section 2 violation.28 The preconditions set by
Gingles still dictate the test that courts apply today.29 It is now
well settled that minority vote dilution, in addition to simply
denied access or abridgment, violates the Act.30
The Supreme Court pronounced three “pre-conditions”
in Gingles, which act as a gateway for all section 2 claims: (1)
the minority group must be sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in a singlemember district; (2) the minority group must be politically
cohesive; and (3) the white majority must vote sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it to usually defeat the minority’s preferred
candidate.31 Only when these three conditions have been met
does a court move on to determine whether there has been a
violation.32 This analysis is based on the “totality of
circumstances,” which includes factors envisioned by Congress
when it passed the 1982 Amendments:33 (a) a history of official
discrimination; (b) the extent of racially polarized voting; (c) the
electoral practices that enhance opportunities for discrimination;
(d) access to the candidate-slating process; (e) discrimination in
other areas that hinders the ability of the minority group to
participate effectively in the political process; (f) racial appeals
“intent” requirement, and thus only attacked the “manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right to vote,” with a focus on the discriminatory effects. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added). The 1982 Amendments rejected the plurality view
of City of Mobile, 446 U.S. at 74, which required a plaintiff to show discriminatory
intent. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 71 (1986). The 1982 Amendments
also outlined a test for determining whether a violation of section 2 had occurred. See
42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006); see also Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1241.
27
478 U.S. 30 (1986).
28
See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-44, 50-51.
29
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51; see also Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1241 (discussing
and evaluating the necessary Gingles preconditions to establish a section 2 violation).
30
Vote dilution has long been considered violative of the Act, although
certain Supreme Court Justices prefer a purely textual reading of section 2, which
would preclude vote dilution claims altogether. Justices Thomas and Scalia have
endorsed such a textual reading of section 2, whereby vote dilution does not establish a
“standard, practice, or procedure” and thus should not be challenged under the Act.
See, e.g., Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1250 (Thomas, J., concurring); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S.
874, 892 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
31
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50-51.
32
See, e.g., Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1241 (“In a [section] 2 case, only when a
party has established the Gingles requirements does a court proceed to analyze
whether a violation has occurred based on the totality of the circumstances.”).
33
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36-37; see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997,
1010-11 (1994).
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in political campaigns; and (g) election of members of the
minority group to public office in the jurisdiction.34 When a
plaintiff proves a prima facie case of vote dilution under the
Gingles preconditions, and the court further determines that the
“totality of circumstances” is also met, the defendant political
subdivision must implement a cure for the violation.
B.

The Traditional Cure for a Section 2 Violation: SingleMember Districts

Since the Court’s decision in Gingles, the traditional
remedy employed for section 2 violations is the drawing of
single-member districts. Single-member districts within a
political subdivision are typically implemented as a cure for the
at-large, “winner-take-all” election practices that are
challenged under section 2.35 In an at-large election, each voter
may cast one vote for the number of empty seats, and the
candidates who receive the most votes fill the positions.36 This
was the system that existed in Port Chester prior to the
implementation of cumulative voting, and it is often the system
challenged in section 2 actions.37 At-large voting systems do
require heightened review by the DOJ and are usually the
subjects of section 2 claims because they tend to squash the
minority vote.38 Essentially, the minority vote’s strength is
diluted because the majority votes as a bloc to fill vacancies.39 If
a section 2 violation is found after litigation, the courts usually
34

See, e.g., De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1010 & n.9 (summarizing factors from the
Senate Report regarding the 1982 Amendments for a section 2 claim).
35
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 338, 362 (“An oft-repeated
principle in voting rights cases is that single-member districts are ‘strongly preferred’
to at-large plans for court-ordered . . . remedies.”).
36
See id. at 336.
37
See United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets
the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689, 708-09 (2006).
38
See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT 277, 302 n.13 (David L. Epstein et al., eds. 2006); see also Peyton McCrary,
Christopher Seaman & Richard Valelly, The Law of Preclearance: Enforcing Section 5,
in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, supra, at 20, 24 (noting that in the context
of section 5 preclearance submissions, changes from single districts to at-large elections
could be retrogressive in effect).
39
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 337-38 (“Voting rights
jurisprudence has long acknowledged . . . that wherever minority and majority groups
have differing voting patterns, the winner-take-all at-large method tends to dilute
minority voting strength, because the majority group tends to vote as a bloc to fill all
the available seats. This phenomenon is known as ‘vote dilution.’ Courts have also
recognized that such features as numbered posts, staggered terms, and majority vote
requirements can exacerbate the at-large method’s dilutive effect.”).
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mandate that single-member districts be drawn to encompass a
group that is geographically compact enough to elect its
candidate of choice and thus eradicate the harm of the “winnertake-all” system—the very requirement that exists in the first
Gingles precondition.40
The courts and the DOJ have certainly articulated their
preference for single-member districts, especially in early
Voting Rights Act jurisprudence.41 Supreme Court decisions
also evidence districting as a means to give minorities more
voting influence, as does the Supreme Court’s use of singlemember districts as a benchmarking tool to determine liability.
While they are the popular and presumptive remedy for
a section 2 violation, single-member districts that create
geographic compactness of minorities—as required, too, by the
first
Gingles
precondition—became
hypersensitive
to
constitutional attack in the 1990s, and continue to be
scrutinized today.42 In the seminal case Shaw v. Reno,43 the
Supreme Court held that districts drawn according to race are
subject to strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court later determined
that strict constitutional scrutiny is applied whenever “race
was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s
decision to place a significant number of voters within or
without a particular district.”44 Thus, while single-member
districts redress the problems of at-large, winner-take-all
systems by giving a minority group potential power in
40

See id. at 363 (“By requiring plaintiffs to show they are numerous and
compact enough to draw a single-member district as a threshold matter in order to find
liability, Gingles arguably implies that the universe of [s]ection 2 remedies is limited to
single-member districts. Indeed, the Court notes that single-member district systems
are generally the appropriate standard against which to measure minority group
potential to elect because it is the smallest political unit from which representatives
are elected.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41
See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1975) (discussing the
Court’s preference for single-member districts).
42
See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes & Kristen A. Donoghue, Voting Rights and
Elections: Cumulative Voting in the United States, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 249
(1995); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1258 (2009) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (noting that to meet a threshold large enough to constitute a minority’s
opportunity to elect, a state will be forced to use race-conscious measures, which will
leave it vulnerable to equal-protection challenges).
43
509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993) (finding that where a district is drawn that is so
oddly shaped as to be “irrational on its face . . . it can be understood only as an effort to
segregate voters into separate voting districts,” and is subject to strict scrutiny). Miller v.
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), foreclosed the notion that a mapped district would have to
look irrational on its face to be violative of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 912.
44
Miller, 515 U.S. at 916, 920 (explaining that a “congressional redistricting
plan cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny, [the] most rigorous and exacting
standard of constitutional review”); see also Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 241.
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geographic compactness, racial districting as a practice is
subject to strict scrutiny as a kind of “reverse” discrimination.45
Indeed, the decision in Shaw along with its progeny has
curtailed the ability of a political subdivision to draw majorityminority districts, leaving those subdivisions that do
implement these districts vulnerable to equal-protection
challenges.46 The Shaw line of cases, as an extension of the
equal-protection doctrine, asserts that district-drawing to
obtain a certain number of minorities of voting age within a
given district does nothing more than “reinforce the ideas that
the racial group thinks alike, shares the same political
interests, and will prefer the same candidates at the polls.”47 As
a result, race cannot be the predominant factor in configuring a
district, which obviously creates tension between the cause of
and cure for dilution.48
After Shaw, political subdivisions and scholars
struggled to develop solutions to cure vote dilution without
running afoul of Shaw and the Equal Protection Clause. Many
in the legal academy explored the benefits of coalitional, or
“crossover,” districts as remedies for section 2 violations.49 A
45

See Note, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining
Racially Polarized Voting, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2208, 2208-09 (2003). The Court’s
reluctance to readily sanction majority-minority districts in light of Shaw and its
progeny has sparked debate within the academic community regarding remedial
measures. Influence and coalitional or crossover districts were viewed initially as
viable alternatives. LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 412 (2006), and Bartlett, 129 S. Ct.
at 1247-49, held, however, that influence and crossover districts, respectively, cannot
be used to prove vote dilution (and thus, by implication, cannot be used as a legally
imposed remedy for section 2).
46
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 346 (discussing racial
gerrymandering and equal-protection violations).
47
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993); see also Mulroy, The Way Out,
supra note 12, at 347.
48
See Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-17. As Steven J. Mulroy notes, the
“Shaw/Miller cases and their progeny . . . create a dilemma for anyone interested in
drawing fair electoral districts. The Voting Rights Act requires that race be taken into
account when drawing districts, but the Shaw cause of action requires that race not be
used ‘too much.’” Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 348.
49
See Yishaiya Absoch, Matt A. Barreto & Nathan D. Woods, An Assessment
of Racially Polarized Voting for and Against Latino Candidates in California, in
VOTING RIGHTS ACT: REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY,
PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 107, 108 (Ana Henderson ed., 2007); Note, The Future of
Majority-Minority Districts in Light of Declining Racially Polarized Voting, supra note
45, at 2228; see generally Luke P. McLoughlin, Note, Gingles in Limbo: Coalitional
Districts, Party Primaries and Manageable Vote Dilution Claims, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 312
(2005). Scholars found support for the coalitional district as a remedy to section 2
violations in Supreme Court precedent. See Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482
(2003) (“[S]tudies have suggested that the most effective way to maximize minority
voting strength may be to create more influence or coalitional districts.”); Thornburg v.
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 90 n.1 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[W]hen the candidates
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crossover district is a district in which the group of minority
voters makes up less than a majority of the voting-age
population, but in which the minority population is big enough
to elect its candidate of choice with help from voters who are
members of the majority that “cross over” to support the
minority group’s candidate of choice.50 Crossover districts were
thought to be “superior to majority-minority districts because
the smaller the number of minority voters required per district,
the smaller the need to disregard traditional districting
principles and the less likely that a court will invalidate a
newly drawn district on equal-protection grounds.”51
While crossover districts seem to embody the spirit of
the Voting Rights Act and breed coalitional unity between
minority and majority voters in order to elect a minority
group’s preferred candidate, the Supreme Court ruled in
Bartlett v. Strickland that the Voting Rights Act did not
provide a cause of action for those minority voters who could
elect a candidate of choice with even a small crossover vote
from the white majority.52 Bartlett thus established that, for the
purposes of the first Gingles precondition, single-member
benchmark districts drawn for establishing liability must
comprise more than a fifty percent minority voting age
population (VAP) or citizen voting age population (CVAP).53
Crossover districts would have enlarged the scope of section 2
claims—and available court-ordered remedies. But Bartlett
foreclosed this ability. The DOJ and other individuals with
preferred by a minority group are elected in a multimember district, the minority group
has elected those candidates, even if white support was indispensible to these victories.”).
50
See, e.g., Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1242 (2009) (describing
crossover districts).
51
Absoch et al., supra note 49, at 108.
52
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1246 (plurality opinion) (holding that the first
Gingles precondition requires a showing that the minority population in a majorityminority district makes up more than fifty percent VAP/CVAP, and that majorityminority districts are only required by law if all three Gingles factors are met).
53
See id. at 1246-47. Before Bartlett, some courts had applied a fifty percent
numerical threshold for the sake of ease; the precise number of majority voters within
a district was a question left open in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See, e.g.,
McLoughlin, supra note 49, at 319. The Bartlett Court did not address specifically
whether the numerical applied to VAP or CVAP. Pre-Bartlett, many circuit courts used
CVAP as the appropriate metric. See Nathaniel Persily, The Law of the Census: How to
Count, What to Count, Whom to Count, and Where to Count Them, 32 CARDOZO L. REV.
755, 779 (2011). In a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case post-Bartlett, the court
recognized CVAP as the appropriate measure, and also asserted that while Bartlett did
not address the question head-on, the opinion’s language indicates that CVAP is the
applicable population nonetheless. See Reyes v. City of Farmers Branch, 586 F.3d 1019,
1023-24 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Persily, supra, at 779.
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standing cannot now challenge perceived vote-dilutive practices
under section 2 based on the minority population’s potential to
elect in a crossover district, nor can the court order what might
have been this more race-neutral remedy.54 Bartlett therefore
resurrects the concerns of Shaw to some extent, as singlemember districts must be drawn to encompass an exact
majority percentage of minorities in order to satisfy Gingles—a
practice that seems Voting-Rights-Act-retrogressive in itself.55
But the Bartlett Court noted that requiring crossover districts
for section 2 violations would breed even more race-conscious
district drawing.56 Without crossover districts as a viable
challenge-worthy scheme or court-mandated remedy for vote
dilution after Bartlett, it is time again to explore alternative
forms of democratic representation that can cure section 2
violations. Cumulative voting can be used as such a remedy.
C.

Cumulative Voting: An Alternative Electoral Process

Cumulative voting is a method of at-large election
voting where every voter gets as many votes as there are seats
for the open posts in a given election, and voters can distribute
their ballots as they please.57 That is, “under cumulative voting,
a voter may distribute votes among candidates in any
54

See, e.g., Ellen D. Katz, Engineering the Endgame, 109 MICH. L. REV. 349,
370-71 (2010).
55
See id. at 370 (“Bartlett highlights how scaling back a remedy may produce
perverse effects. . . . [T]he Justices cut off an application of the statute that promised to
encourage the type of political participation the Court has long claimed it wants to
promote—namely, the type that yields cross-racial coalitions. At the same time, the
Justices restricted the statute’s reach to protect the type of participation they most
dislike—namely, that secured by the majority-minority district.”). It should be noted
that the Court did not admonish the drawing of such districts—it encouraged them in
so far as coalition voting would foster communication of races. Political subdivisions
could draw such districts on their own, of course, but such a coalition district could not
be used to draw a remedial plan to prove voter dilution pursuant to the first Gingles
precondition. See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1248.
56
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1249.
It would be an irony, however, if [section] 2 were interpreted to entrench racial
differences by expanding a statute meant to hasten the waning of racism in
American politics. Crossover districts are, by definition, the result of white
voters joining forces with minority voters to elect their preferred candidate. The
Voting Rights Act was passed to foster this cooperation. We decline now to
expand the reaches of [section] 2 to require, by force of law, the voluntary
cooperation our society has achieved.
Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
57
See Joseph F. Zimmerman, The Federal Voting Rights Act and Alternative
Election Systems, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 654-57 (1978).
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combination, even distributing all votes to one candidate.”58
Cumulative voting embodies a type of proportional
representation.59 In predicting the election outcome for a
minority group under cumulative voting, a simple calculation
of the “threshold of exclusion” is used. The threshold of
exclusion is calculated as “one” divided by “one more” than the
number of seats to be filled. Therefore, in a cumulative voting
system, in order for a minority population to have a realistic
opportunity to elect its preferred candidate, that minority
population must make up greater than “1 / n+1” of the
population, where “n” is equal to the number of seats up for
election.60 The resultant number of this formula is the
“threshold of exclusion.”61 This number is equal to the
percentage of votes that any group of voters must exceed in
order to elect a candidate of its choice, regardless of how the
rest of the voters cast their ballots. The system allows “a
numerical minority to concentrate its voting power behind a
given candidate without requiring that the minority voters
themselves be concentrated into a single district.”62 The Equal
Protection Clause is thus not implicated by cumulative voting.
In practice, cumulative voting is more commonly
associated with corporate governance and has been used to
elect members to corporate boards.63 But cumulative voting has
also been used in the political arena. From 1870 to 1980,
Illinois used cumulative voting to elect members of its general
assembly.64 The cumulative voting scheme has also been used to
elect minority-preferred candidates in communities in Illinois,
Alabama, North Carolina, South Dakota, and more than two

58

Brischetto, supra note 11; see also Zimmerman, supra note 57, at 654.
See Jeffrey C. O’Neill, Everything That Can Be Counted Does Not
Necessarily Count: The Right to Vote and the Choice of a Voting System, 2006 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 327, 375 (2006).
60
See, e.g., Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 341 (outlining calculation
for the threshold of exclusion).
61
See id.
62
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 910 n.15 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
63
See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 232-33
(1989) (“Surprisingly, although cumulative voting is quite widespread in elections for
corporate boards of directors, it has been used rarely in elections for political office.”);
see also Brischetto, supra note 11 (“Cumulative voting has . . . been used for decades to
elect members of many corporate boards of directors.”).
64
Brischetto, supra note 11.
59
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dozen local political subdivisions in Texas.65 While cumulative
voting has been effective in these places,66 it should be noted that
cumulative voting is often considered more advanced than voting
in single-member districts; it requires that “voters understand
how to navigate the system and turn out to cast their ballots in
sufficient number to elect a candidate preferred by the minority
but not the majority of voters,” and studies have shown that this
does not always happen.67 Voters need to be educated in how best
to “plump” their votes, and vote cohesively for their candidate of
choice. And while it has been called controversial, no court has
found cumulative voting unconstitutional.
D.

Cumulative Voting Has Never Been Ruled Illegal by
Federal Courts—But Dicta Has Sent Mixed Messages

While cumulative voting schemes have typically been
implemented as settlement agreements between litigating
parties in section 2 actions,68 no case has held that cumulative
voting is an illegal or unconstitutional remedial measure for
violations of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.69 Although, as the
Port Chester Court noted, the DOJ would have liked the court to
“believe that cumulative voting has been consistently rejected as
a remedy to a section 2 violation,”70 this is not entirely true.

65

See Communities in America Currently Using Proportional Voting,
FAIRVOTE: PROGRAM FOR REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, http://archive.fairvote.org/
index.php?page=2101 (last visited Mar. 14, 2011).
66
See, e.g., Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 301 (discussing cumulative
voting in Chilton County, Alabama, and noting that “[c]umulative voting has been
quite effective, even in the face of racially polarized voting, at bringing about minority
representation—not just for racial minorities, but for women and political minorities as
well”); see also Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 349 (discussing cumulative
voting successes in different political subdivisions).
67
Katz, supra note 54, at 384.
68
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 346 (noting that alternative
electoral systems started to come about as settlement agreements in the 1980s).
69
United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 448 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (“There is no case law that rejects cumulative voting as a lawful remedy under the
Voting Rights Act. Recently, a district court in the Northern District of Ohio did exactly
what Port Chester is asking of the Court in this case: it accepted the defendant’s proposal
for limited voting instead of the plaintiffs’ districting plan to remedy a [s]ection 2
violation.”). As a note, the DOJ also submitted arguments to oppose the Ohio
jurisdiction’s proposed remedy of cumulative voting. See generally United States
Memorandum in Opposition to Euclid City School Board’s Proposed Remedies, United
States v. Euclid City Sch. Dist., 632 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (No. 08-cv-2832)
[hereinafter U.S. Memorandum in Opposition to Euclid City Sch. Dist.].
70
Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
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1. Cases That Note the Permissibility of Cumulative
Voting as a Cure
Importantly, a few cases have noted the possibility that
cumulative voting could serve as a potential cure for vote
imbalances. For example, in Holder v. Hall,71 Justice Thomas
noted in his concurring opinion that the implementation of
alternative voting systems
may seem [like] radical departures from the electoral systems with
which we are most familiar. Indeed, they may be unwanted by the
people in the several States who purposely have adopted districting
systems in their electoral laws. But nothing in our present
understanding of the Voting Rights Act places a principled limit on
the authority of federal courts that would prevent them from
instituting a system of cumulative voting as a remedy under
[section] 2 . . . .72

Similarly, in Branch v. Smith,73 Justice O’Connor stated
that “a court could design an at-large election plan that awards
seats on a cumulative basis, or some other method that would
result in a plan that satisfies the Voting Rights Act.”74 One
court mandated a cumulative voting system for County
Commissioner elections. It ruled that “primary elections would
be conducted using the electoral districts submitted in the
County’s second proposed remedial plan and that the general
election would be conducted on a countywide basis using
cumulative voting.”75 On appeal, this scheme was found to be
impermissible, but only because the lower court did not consider
the preference of the defendant and give deference as required.76
71
72

512 U.S. 874 (1994).
Id. at 910 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also noted that:

districting is merely another political choice made by the citizenry in the
drafting of their state constitutions. Like other political choices concerning
electoral systems and models of representation, it too is presumably subject to a
judicial override if it comes into conflict with the theories of representation and
effective voting that we may develop under the Voting Rights Act.
Id. at 911.
73

538 U.S. 254, 309-10 (2003).
Id. at 309-10 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing the fact that at-large
elections can be remedial for violations of section 2 or section 5, so long as they provide
appropriate representation with respect to population).
75
Cane v. Worcester Cnty., Nos. 95-1122, 95-1688, 1995 WL 371008, at *2-3
(4th Cir. June 16, 1995).
76
Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
court abused its discretion in imposing the preferred voting system of the plaintiff—
cumulative voting).
74
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The Port Chester Court also ordered that the system be
used as a cure. The new voting system in Port Chester is currently
the only court-imposed (as opposed to simply court-ratified), stillviable remedial cumulative voting scheme in existence.
These decisions show that federal courts—and even the
Supreme Court—are willing to sanction alternative electoral
schemes.
2. Cases That Cast Doubt on Cumulative Voting as a
Cure
Other courts have been reluctant to support cumulative
voting as a remedial measure. Indeed, in certain contexts,
while not striking cumulative voting down as illegal, circuit
courts of appeals have determined that cumulative voting is, at
times, an inappropriate remedy for section 2 violations.
For example, in Cousin v. Sundquist,77 at issue was the
alleged dilution of the African American vote in the election of
judges in Hamilton County, Tennessee. After cumulative voting
was ordered by the district court, the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court because it was not
convinced that a violation had even occurred.78 But this did not
stop the court from discussing its views about cumulative
voting: “[W]e feel that cumulative voting, the remedy ordered
by the district court in this case, is an inappropriate remedy for
a section 2 claim, and especially so when imposed on the
election of state court judges.”79 The court also asserted that
cumulative voting “would encourage racial bloc voting,” and
warned the system had the potential to entrench factions in the
judiciary.80 The court concluded that the system would increase
competitiveness to obtain as many votes as possible, vitiating
collegiality among judges on the bench, and would be a
movement towards proportional representation—something
the court admonished.81
In Dillard v. Baldwin County Commissioners,82 the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the
cumulative voting system that Dillard sought was not an
77
78
79
80
81
82

145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 821-22.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 830-31.
Id.
376 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2004).
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appropriate section 2 remedy. The district court had recognized
that “there [was] no objective and workable standard for
choosing [it as a] reasonable benchmark[ ] over the many forms
of government.”83 The court also noted that the first Gingles
precondition is not without limitations: the federal courts could
not concoct any remedy they so chose if the remedy had never
been contemplated before by the state.84 Thus, while circuit
courts have discussed an apprehension about implementing
cumulative voting as a remedial cure based on case-specific
facts—like the nature of judicial elections—no court has
determined that cumulative voting by its nature is illegal as a
cure.85 These mixed messages on cumulative voting as a remedial
measure offer little aid in trying to assess the potential of
implementing cumulative voting for section 2 violations.

83

Id. at 1264 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1268. Indeed, the question of a reasonable benchmark has been a
trying consideration for the judiciary. See Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880-81 (1994)
(“In certain cases, the benchmark for comparison in a [section] 2 dilution suit is
obvious. The effect of an anti-single-shot voting rule . . . can be evaluated by comparing
the system with that rule to the system without that rule. But where there is no
objective and workable standard for choosing a reasonable benchmark by which to
evaluate a challenged voting practice, it follows that the voting practice cannot be
challenged as dilutive under [section] 2.”) (emphasis added).
85
Two recent cases might have provided further insight into the dilemma of
whether cumulative voting should be used as a remedial measure for section 2
violations. Unfortunately, neither case reached the merits. In another of the “Dillard”
cases, Dillard v. Chilton County Commission, 495 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (11th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit faced a challenge by two litigants who sought to
eradicate the consent decree that mandated cumulative voting as a section 2 remedy on
the ground that Alabama law precluded the system. While the district court had
upheld the challenge and determined that cumulative voting was not an appropriate
remedial measure, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment because
the challengers lacked standing. Id. at 1339-40. The Eleventh Circuit’s decision
disposed of a litigation that had been pending in one form or another before the court
for nearly 20 years—the decision was pending because of individuals’ refusal to accept
the cumulative voting system. Id. at 1327-28. And even more recently, in Cottier v. City
of Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 555 (8th Cir. 2010), Native Americans brought suit under
section 2, claiming that districts had been drawn in such a way that their votes were
diluted. In Cottier, the district court ruled that a violation had occurred, and imposed
the defendants’ third proposed remedial plan: cumulative voting. Id. at 555-56. The
Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 556. However, on appeal and after a rehearing, the
Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that a violation of
the Act had not been proved to begin with, and so never reached the question of
whether cumulative voting was an appropriately imposed remedy by the Court. Id. at
561; see also Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 928 (4th Cir. 1994) (court “not
called upon to outline whether facts and circumstances might justify the imposition of
a cumulative voting plan on a political subdivision,” and review was limited to the
specific facts and circumstances where the district court abused its discretion in
adopting the cumulative voting scheme).
84
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THE SECTION 2 ENFORCEMENT ACTION IN PORT CHESTER

Courts have not provided clear guidance about whether
cumulative voting is an appropriate remedial measure for
section 2 violations, but the section 2 enforcement action in
Port Chester provides more insight into the DOJ’s position
regarding implementation of the system. Until 2006, the
Village of Port Chester, New York, had an electoral system that
used at-large voting to elect six members of a Board of Trustees
(the Board). Every year, the Village’s voters elected two of the
Board’s members for three-year terms.86 Under this system,
each voter was permitted two votes for each calendar year.87 He
or she could cast one vote for two separate candidates or,
alternatively, he or she could cast one vote for a single
candidate and withhold the other vote.88 Port Chester, with a
population of 27,867, has a plurality of Hispanics who comprise
46.2% of the Village’s total population; non-Hispanic whites
make up 42.8% of the total population.89
In December 2006, the United States sued the Village of
Port Chester in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York, alleging violations under section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act in that the large Hispanic population had
been denied fair representation in local government.90 The DOJ
requested a preliminary injunction under the Act to prevent
the Village from holding its spring election for Board
members.91 The injunction was granted.92 After a six-day bench
trial, the court concluded that the Village’s current practice of
electing Board members was in violation of section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act because it diluted the Hispanic vote in
accordance with Gingles.93 Each party was permitted to submit
briefs thereafter, outlining prospective remedial plans for how
to solve the lack of fair representation in the new elections.94
86

United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Id.
88
Id. This practice is known as “bullet” or “single shot” voting. Id.
89
Id. at 419. All population percentages are as of the 2000 Census. Id.
90
Id. at 416.
91
Id. Cesar Ruiz intervened as a plaintiff in this action. Id. at 417. Ruiz had
received nearly all the Hispanic votes in 2006 for a seat on the Board of Trustees, but
still did not garner enough support to win a spot. Id. at 431.
92
Id. at 416.
93
Id. at 417, 453. The court determined this through its analysis of the
preconditions and factors set forth in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). Id. at 420-47.
94
Id. at 417. FairVote also submitted an amicus brief in which it advocated
for cumulative voting. Id. FairVote is an advocacy group for election reform that strives
87
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The DOJ set forth a plan that would have established
six districts within the Village, one for each Trustee on the
Board.95 Once the districts were drawn, voters would cast their
ballots for a single Board member from their district.96 All seats
would be voted for simultaneously in the first new election,
with staggered terms thereafter.97 The Village proposed an
alternative plan: members of the six-person Board would still
be elected through an at-large, multimember system, but the
system would use cumulative voting to elect all six members of
the Board concurrently.98 The DOJ opposed the plan, but the
court adopted Port Chester’s proposed remedy, giving required
deference to the jurisdiction and local legislature.99
A.

Understanding the Department of Justice’s Position on
Cumulative Voting: The DOJ’s Rejection of the Port
Chester Plan

In its opposition brief to the Village’s proposed
cumulative voting remedy, the DOJ cryptically noted that,
while it objected to cumulative voting, “[t]his is not to say that
cumulative voting would never be an appropriate remedy in a
[section] 2 case.”100 Here, however, the DOJ rejected Port
Chester’s proposal as an inappropriate remedy.101 In fact, the
DOJ’s opposition to cumulative voting in Port Chester seems
more vociferous than the DOJ’s opposition to cumulative voting
in other cases; in the past, the DOJ seemed more ready to

to “respect every vote and every voice through bold approaches to increase voter
turnout, meaningful ballot choices and fair representation.” See Who We Are,
FAIRVOTE: THE CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, http://www.fairvote.org/who-weare (last visited Mar. 11, 2011).
95
See Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 420, 447; Memorandum of Law of the
United States of America in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan at 6,
Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-cv-15173).
96
See Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 447.
97
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 21-22.
98
See Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief at 1, 17, Port Chester, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-cv-15173).
99
Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 453; see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783,
794-95 (1973); Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Once a violation
of [section] 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been established, a district court should give the
appropriate legislative body the first opportunity to devise a remedial plan.”).
100
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 20.
101
See id.
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embrace the system.102 Regardless, the DOJ argued that Port
Chester’s plan was deficient for several reasons.
First, the DOJ noted that courts may not order
multimember districts “absent insurmountable difficulties’ in
using single member districts.”103 It argued that “cumulative
voting [was] plainly not a viable alternative for Port Chester
compared to the presumptive remedy of single-member
districts”—especially because the Hispanic population was not
so geographically dispersed.104 Next, addressing what
FairVote—a voting advocacy group that submitted an amicus
brief endorsing cumulative voting—perceived to be a
prevalence of jurisdictions nationwide that have adopted
cumulative voting as a remedy for section 2 violations, the DOJ
noted summarily that the approximately sixty jurisdictions
where cumulative voting had been implemented as a cure were
mostly located in Texas and other areas in the South, and
applied mostly to school boards.105 The significance of this
geographic concentration was not detailed. The DOJ also
argued that, upon appellate review, cumulative voting plans
had been rejected wholesale by circuit courts.106 In each of these
situations, it claimed, the courts had described cumulative
voting as too “unconventional,” or as impermissibly preserving
at-large systems.107 And while noting that the DOJ had never
discussed
cumulative
voting
as
an
“outright
improper . . . remedy to a section 2 violation,” the DOJ
102

See, e.g., Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 9
(discussing four cases where the DOJ, either as amicus or litigating party, indicated
that cumulative voting could be a viable remedy option for section 2 violations). Steven
J. Mulroy speculates that the heightened opposition to cumulative voting in this case
might be related to the fact that the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Southern District of
New York, not the central DOJ in Washington, D.C., took the lead in the Port Chester
case. Telephone Interview with Steven J. Mulroy, Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys Sch.
of Law (Apr. 3, 2011).
103
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 16 (quoting Chapman v.
Meier, 410 U.S. 1, 18 (1975)).
104
Id. at 20.
105
Id. at 17. For a current list of political subdivisions where cumulative
voting is in effect, see Communities in America Currently Using Proportional Voting,
supra note 65.
106
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 17-18. Here, the DOJ cited
several cases for this proposition, including Dillard v. Baldwin County Commissioners,
376 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2004), Harper v. City of Chicago Heights, 223 F.3d 593 (7th
Cir. 2000), Cousin v. Sundquist, 145 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998), Cane v. Worcester County
Commission, 35 F.3d 921 (4th Cir. 1994), and LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th
Cir. 1993). Id.
107
Id.
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contended that the Village and FairVote108 falsely characterized
the DOJ’s positive stance on cumulative voting.109 For example,
the Village and FairVote each noted that the DOJ had almost
always allowed for new cumulative voting process changes
under the section 5 preclearance procedure.110 The DOJ argued
that the preclearance procedure is not the same as a remedy
under section 2.111
Finally, the DOJ expressed its concern with the
practical application of cumulative voting in Port Chester.
Specifically, the DOJ noted that, with the exponential growth
of the Hispanic population in Port Chester, the “Hispanic
community could come to dominate the political landscape in
Port Chester even under the current at-large system.”112 The
DOJ asserted that cumulative voting tends to produce “one, but
only one, heavily supported minority candidate,” and “[i]n the
context of a steadily increasing Hispanic population in Port
Chester, cumulative voting could restrain the ability of
Hispanics to elect more than one Hispanic-preferred Trustee.”113
This argument, however, seems to be at odds with the DOJ’s
vote-dilution claim.
The court rejected the DOJ’s arguments, addressing some
more directly than others. The court did not attack the DOJ’s
assertion that single-member districts are highly presumptive
remedies, nor did it address the relevance of the fact that
cumulative voting has been used almost exclusively in the South.
The court did, however, distinguish the facts of courts of appeals
cases that the DOJ cited.114 In the instances where cumulative
108

FairVote submitted an amicus brief in support of alternative voting
schemes, and advocated for Port Chester’s chosen scheme of cumulative voting as well
as choice voting. See generally Brief of Amicus Curiae, United States v. Vill. of Port
Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (06-civ-15173).
109
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 20.
110
Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 8; Brief of
Amicus Curiae, supra note 108, at 15.
111
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 21. For a more detailed
discussion of the interplay between section 2 and section 5, see infra Part III.A.
112
Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 21.
113
Id.
114
United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 449 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (noting that in cases where a district court’s order of cumulative voting was stuck
down, “the circuit courts found either that the district court improperly imposed its
own remedy without first finding that defendant’s plan was not legally
acceptable . . . or the district court’s plan did not adequately take into account the
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voting was rejected, the district courts either did not defer to the
political subdivision’s preferred remedies as required by law or
impermissibly mandated a voting scheme on their own.115
The court also found that, specific to the Village, the
proposed remedy was legal under the Voting Rights Act and
New York law, and would cleanse the section 2 violation.116
Notably, it would not require Hispanics to see ultimate success
in the election; it would simply “provide a genuine opportunity
to exercise an electoral power that is commensurate with its
population.”117 The court noted that an expert had applied the
“threshold of exclusion”118 test to determine that Hispanic voters
would enjoy an actual opportunity to elect their candidate of
choice.119 Further, the court found that, in the specific context of
the Village of Port Chester, the implementation of cumulative
voting would not create a new section 2 violation so long as the
implementation process included a robust educational program
and staggered terms were eliminated.120 Finally, benefits of the
plan were clear: it did not violate the “one-person, one vote”
requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, and would not
require racial districting.121 Because the Village’s Plan was
legally and factually defensible, the court gave due deference to
the Village’s legislative policy judgments.122 On December 22,
2009, the parties signed a consent decree, which the court

preferences of the defendant . . . [or] was deemed inappropriate in judicial elections for
reasons unique to the judiciary”) (internal citations omitted).
115
Id.
116
Id. at 447-51.
117
Id. at 449 (quoting LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 428 (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
118
The court took into account the possibility that the white majority would
not support the minority-preferred candidate at all. Id. at 450 (explaining that the
threshold of exclusion takes the “worst case scenario” into account). The “threshold of
exclusion” is “the percentage of the vote that will guarantee the winning of a seat even
under the most unfavorable circumstances.” Cottier v. City of Martin, 475 F. Supp. 2d
932, 937 (D.S.D. 2007), aff’d 551 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d en banc 604 F.3d 553 (8th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 870, 874 (M.D. Ala.
1988)); see also Steven J. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out: A Remedial Road Map for the
Use of Alternative Electoral Systems as Voting Rights Act Remedies, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1867,
1880 (1999) [hereinafter Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out] (explaining the threshold of
exclusion is calculated by “1” divided by the numbers of seats available plus “1”).
119
Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 450.
120
Id. at 451-52.
121
Id. at 452-53.
122
Id. at 453; see also Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir.
1994) (“Once a violation of [section] 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been established, a
district court should give the appropriate legislative body the first opportunity to
devise a remedial plan.”).
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entered, directing the Village to implement cumulative voting
with a number of provisions.123
Importantly, in a four-to-two vote of the Board, the
Village determined that it would appeal the section 2 liability
ruling of the district court.124 But for now, the cumulative voting
scheme still stands.

123

See generally Consent Decree, Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06Civ-15173). The decree “remain[s] in effect through June 22, 2016 or three election
cycles, whichever is longer.” Id. ¶ 10.
124
See Kirk Semple, Port Chester to Appeal U.S. Voting-Rights Ruling Aimed at
Helping Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/02/24/nyregion/24chester.html; see also United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), appeal docketed, No. 11-1831 (2d Cir. May 5, 2011). The
Village has only indicated that a recent Supreme Court case lends support to the
argument there was no impermissible vote dilution practice employed in Port Chester’s
election process when the DOJ brought suit. See Port Chester Appeals Federal Voting
Rights Ruling, CBS N.Y., Feb. 24, 2011, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/02/24/portchester-appeals-federal-voting-rights-ruling. Assumedly, the Village intends to base its
appeal on Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009). In its motion for
reconsideration in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the
Village argued several points that it considered grounds for reconsideration. Among
them, the two upon which the Village will likely base its appeal are (1) the election of
what the Village deems to be minority-preferred candidates, aside from those elected
through cumulative voting in the June 2010 election, and (2) dicta in Bartlett v.
Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, which contemplated that if a crossover district were
allowed to satisfy the first Gingles prong, the third Gingles prong would come under
greater scrutiny. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider
5-14, Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-Civ-15173). Port Chester will likely
contend that Mayor Dennis Pilla, who was previously found to be a Hispanic-preferred
candidate, has been elected as mayor twice since the court determined the Village’s
section 2 liability. See id. at 5; see also Nathan Mayberg & Jananne Abel, Pilla Wins
Re-election by a Landslide, PORT CHESTER WESTMORE NEWS, MAR. 18, 2011,
http://pc.westmorenews.com/atf.php?sid=16216&current_edition=
2011-03-18. This will naturally require the Village to proffer evidence in support of its
theory. The Village will also likely contend that, in previous elections, crossover
districts were a factor, and did, in fact, aid the Hispanic population in electing its
candidate of choice. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion to
Reconsider, supra, at 8-14. Because Bartlett dicta seemed to say that a district that
used a crossover majority vote to prove an opportunity to elect would have difficulty
proving the third Gingles precondition—that the white majority votes in a sufficient
bloc to preclude the effectiveness of the minority vote—the Village will likely argue
that such was the case in Port Chester, and that, therefore, the DOJ should not have
been able to make out a prima facie case of vote dilution. In opposition to Port
Chester’s motion for reconsideration, the DOJ argued that it had not based its
enforcement action on a crossover district theory at all. See Memorandum of Law of the
United States of America in Opposition to Port Chester’s Motion to Reconsider 11, Port
Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (No. 06-Civ-15173). Rather, the DOJ had shown that
Hispanic voters in Port Chester comprised more than fifty percent CVAP in the
relevant district—what was ultimately required by Bartlett—and had shown that the
Hispanic vote was, in fact, diluted. Id. at 11-12. The DOJ’s motion to dismiss the
appeal is pending as this note goes to press. See Motion of the United States to Dismiss
the Appeal, United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 11-1831 (2d Cir. June7, 2011).
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Cumulative Voting Carries the Election Day in Port
Chester

In June 2010, the Village of Port Chester was once
again able to hold elections for the Board of Trustees—but this
time, it had a new system to use.125 It was the first time that
cumulative voting would be used in the state of New York.126 In
addition to Election Day, the polls were open for five days of
early voting.127 Many voted as often as they were allowed, with
individuals casting up to six votes for one candidate, or
distributing their votes as they pleased.128 An exit poll showed
that “[t]urnout was at least 10% higher than in recent Port
Chester municipal elections.”129
The consent decree set forth a number of provisions that
were to be followed in accordance with the implementation of
the cumulative voting system. The “Voter Education Program”
of the decree mandated that the Village implement a number of
new educational elements.130 First, a Program Coordinator,
fluent in both English and Spanish, would be hired and trained
to assist the Village in carrying out the decree.131 The consent
decree required the Village to hold a total of twelve general
public forums—six each in both English in Spanish—prior to
the June 2010 election.132 The forums would provide practice
rounds of voting and training, and would be advertised in local
newspapers and on local radio and television stations.133 After
the initial election, bilingual forums are required each year

125

United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Jim Fitzgerald, Port Chester Election: New York Villagers Get Six Votes Each,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2010, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/15/portchester-election-new_n_612365.html. Accordingly, Judge Robinson embarked on an analysis in
his opinion that demonstrated the legality of the system with respect to the New York
Constitution. Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 448-49.
127
Fitzgerald, supra note 126; see also Early Voting Information, PORT
CHESTER VOTES, http://portchestervotes.org/earlyvoting (last visited Mar. 25, 2011).
128
Fitzgerald, supra note 126.
129
DAVID C. KIMBALL & MARTHA KROPF, CUMULATIVE VOTING EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAM EXIT POLL REPORT, PORT CHESTER, N.Y. ii (Aug. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.umsl.edu/~kimballd/PCFinalReportAug20.pdf.
130
Consent Decree, supra note 123, ¶ 6.
131
Id. app. ¶ 1. “Defendants shall assign one employee to act as Program
Coordinator . . . to assist in carrying out the Defendants’ obligations under this Decree.
The Coordinator shall be able to understand, speak, write, and read fluently both
English and Spanish.” Id.
132
Id. app. ¶¶ 5-6. Among other things, each forum was required to allow the
public to practice cumulative voting. Id.
133
Id.
126
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until 2016.134 The Village sent voters detailed bilingual sample
ballots and instructions before the election, and letters regarding
the new system were also requested to be sent home with public
school students.135 In addition, a number of civic posts, like
libraries, would carry bilingual samples and brochures for voter
information.136 Finally, for the benefit of voters, public forums
educated the community about the candidate-qualifying
process.137 Voters mobilized with t-shirts, signs, and tote bags
that read, “Your voice, your vote, your village.”138
Importantly, the consent decree included a number of
provisions regarding Spanish language assistance. The decree
stressed the necessity of the Village to comply with section 203
of the Voting Rights Act to ensure that both English and
Spanish language election information and materials were
equally available.139 Translators and bilingual election
personnel were to be hired and present at all election-related
events conducted in Port Chester.140 The number of Spanishspeaking poll officials was to be commensurate with the
Hispanic population surrounding each polling place.141 Poll
officials would also receive more training about the
requirements of section 203.142 The Voting Education Plan
Coordinator would keep a log of all of these events, and would
send the log to the DOJ to show the Village’s compliance; the
Village would also prepare a postelection report including exit
134

Id.
Id. app. ¶¶ 7-8.
136
Id. app. ¶ 13. Additionally, the decree required “Defendant . . . [to] make
bilingual persons who are knowledgeable about the cumulative voting process available
to meet with different Hispanic organizations to meet with such organizations and
explain the cumulative voting process,” id. app. ¶ 12, as well as “post a bilingual
sample ballot with detailed instructions concerning the cumulative voting process in
libraries, public assistance agencies, village offices, senior centers, civic centers and
other public places . . . .” Id. app. ¶ 13.
137
Id. app. ¶ 16.
138
Fitzgerald, supra note 126.
139
Consent Decree, supra note 123, app. ¶ 18. Section 203, In relevant part,
requires that “Whenever [a district] . . . provides any registration or voting notices,
forms, instructions, assistance, or other materials or information relating to the
electoral process, including ballots, it shall provide them in the language of the
applicable minority group as well as in the English language.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(c)
(2006). Although, as one scholar notes, “[T]he salad days for [section] 203 and the other
minority language provisions may be coming to an end.” Michael J. Pitts, The Voting
Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. REV. 903, 965 (2008). While section
203 is existing law, it was perhaps reiterated in the consent decree to ensure its
application regardless of the section’s actual status.
140
Consent Decree, supra note 123, app. ¶¶ 19, 22.
141
Id. app. ¶ 24.
142
Id. app. ¶ 26(b).
135
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polling for the United States after each election.143 The decree
expires in 2016 (or, the equivalent of three election cycles); up
until that time, the Village is also subject to the preclearance
requirements of section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act,144 and
must notify the Attorney General of any changes in its voting
practices and receive permission from the Attorney General
before implementing those changes.145
1. Praise for the New System
On June 15, 2010, the Village’s voters elected the first
Hispanic member to the Board.146 Mr. Luis Marino, the newly
elected Board member, said that he felt the new system
benefited him.147 The Mayor of Port Chester, Dennis G. Pilla,
spoke positively of the system, boasting “the results are clear—
that the new system worked.”148 In fact, the system worked not
only to elect the Hispanic-preferred candidate, but it also
created a diverse Board: the villagers elected two democrats,
two republicans, one independent, and one conservative.149 It
was also the first time an African-American was elected to the
Board.150 The Board now comprises a mix of newcomers, like
Marino, and those who have played a part in Port Chester
politics for years: the villagers elected a former mayor to sit on
the Board, as well.151
One of the reasons why the system “worked” was the
education program for which the DOJ advocated in the consent
decree. The exit poll report from the first Port Chester
cumulative voting election shows that “the vast majority of Port
Chester voters showed that they took full advantage of
cumulative voting.”152 In fact, “[m]ore than 95% of voters in all
143

Id. app. ¶¶ 30-31.
42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006).
145
Consent Decree, supra note 123, ¶¶ 9, 11.
146
KIMBALL & KROPF, supra note 129, at 39; Semple, First Latino Board
Member, supra note 1.
147
Semple, First Latino Board Member, supra note 1.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
John Branca, elected to the board in June 2010, was a “trustee from 1983-93
and mayor from 1993-95.” Jananne Abel, Thirteen trustee candidates to choose from on
June 15, PORT CHESTER WESTMORE NEWS, June 11, 2010, http://pc.westmorenews.com/
atf.php?sid=13375&current_edition=2010-06-; Board of Trustees, VILL. OF PORT CHESTER,
N.Y., http://www.portchesterny.com/Pages/PortChesterNY_BTrust/index (last visited
Apr. 11, 2011).
152
KIMBALL & KROPF, supra note 129, at 39.
144
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demographic groups reported that they used all six of their votes
in the election, which comports with the number of votes cast in
the official election results. In addition, voters demonstrated
that they knew how to plump their votes.”153 Importantly, “Latino
voters, African American voters, voters whose first language was
Spanish, and voters who did not finish high school were more
likely to give all of their votes to one candidate. These are the
same demographic groups who reported being more familiar with
cumulative voting.”154 Polled voters spoke highly of the educational
offerings, handouts, and community presentations, which
accounted in large part for their understanding of the new
system.155 The television and radio advertisements also
contributed to their notice and edification.156
This result is not an uncommon one with the
implementation of cumulative voting: “The track record of the
first cumulative voting elections held (pursuant to settlements)
in the late 1980s and early 1990s is . . . impressive . . . from the
standpoint of racial and ethnic minority empowerment.”157 In
fact, “[w]henever racial or ethnic minority candidates ran,
cumulative voting resulted in the election of racial or ethnic
minority candidates for the first time in decades (or ever).”158
For his part, Mayor Pilla is pleased with the new
system.159 He notes that the Village was extremely proactive in
ensuring that the Voter Education Program was implemented
in the most effective way possible.160 And because the system
was so new, elements that might have seemed simple initially
underwent careful scrutiny: the ballot design, for example,
required several draft iterations and the vetting of different
Spanish dialects.161 Two of the most effective tools for voters,
according to the mayor, were the sample ballot and a cumulative
voting “How-To” guide, which were also two of the least
expensive measures the Village employed.162 Mayor Pilla also
153

Id.
Id.
155
Id. at iv-v, 16.
156
Id. at 16.
157
See Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out, supra note 118, at 1891.
158
See id. at 1891-92 (discussing the effectiveness of settlement agreement
implementation of limited, cumulative, and preference voting in different political
subdivisions across the county).
159
Interview with Dennis Pilla, Mayor, Vill. of Port Chester, in Port Chester,
N.Y. (Mar. 27, 2011).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
154
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explains that the Village’s civic educational component was
crucial—it conveyed to citizens why voting in local government
is so significant.163 As Mayor Pilla notes, “It really affects your
day-to-day life more than other forms of government.”164
Mayor Pilla, who is against the appeal, believes that
cumulative voting is a progressive step for the Village, and that,
if the new system unraveled, it would be a step backwards.165
And with the practical knowledge gained from the first election,
he thinks that the system will only become more streamlined so
that the Village’s costs can kept as low as possible.166 He also
accredits the higher voter turnout rate during the June 2010
election in part to “early voting.”167 While early voting within the
Village required more security and staff, it was an effective tool,
and one he believes could be implemented elsewhere to boost
voter turnout.168 Going forward, Mayor Pilla also believes that
cumulative voting with staggered terms should be an option for
the Village, provided that the number of seats up for election at
any given time allows for the Hispanic population to surpass the
threshold of exclusion.169
Professor Steven J. Mulroy is also a proponent of
cumulative voting within the Village—in fact, he consulted
with the Village as it formed its remedial plan.170 Mulroy notes
that the community embodies qualities that are most fitting for
a political subdivision that establishes cumulative voting: the
Hispanic population, while compact in one area, was relatively
dispersed throughout the Village; and the Village’s size,
geographically, is too small to make districting practicable.171
2. Media Backlash
One problem with the DOJ’s refusal to openly sanction the
cumulative voting system—which was evidenced after the Port
Chester case—is the backlash and criticism that resulted within
the public. Implementation of the Port Chester plan was not
163

Id.
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Telephone Interview with Steven J. Mulroy, Professor, Cecil C. Humphreys
Sch. of Law (Apr. 3, 2011).
171
Id.
164
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without critics. One major complaint of commentators was the fact
that the DOJ had not supported the remedy. As one individual
noted, “Judge Robinson . . . overstepped his bounds to impose a
solution that not even Barack Obama’s Justice Department
wanted. . . . [Judge Robinson] should be impeached.”172
Activists who oppose illegal immigration also condemned
the move, noting that the court that implemented the plan
discussed the fact that “there were many more Hispanics who
were not voters” living in the Village, and they asserted that
these individuals were considered in the ultimate decision.173
William Gheen, president of Americans for Legal Immigration
PAC, likened the scheme to racial gerrymandering:
It works only when a minority votes in a racist fashion . . . instead of
choosing candidates on their qualifications. Imagine [a federal
program that turns] 12 million illegal aliens into voters. . . . Envision
a future of when that happens. A lot of people aren’t really thinking
about [when the U.S. would] suddenly have a new voting bloc of 12
million illegal aliens.174

Additionally, the New York Post published a scathing
editorial, which stated that Port Chester “was forced to
swallow a goofy voting scheme that makes sense only if the aim
is to erase the distinction between legal and illegal
immigrants.”175 It went on to note that the remedy was made
possible even though “many of the Latinos are here illegally, so
they can’t vote. No matter. The cockeyed voting system was put
in place to satisfy a claim of discrimination based on their total
numbers, as though immigration status has no consequence to
election results.”176
These critics should be disabused of false notions. First,
any section 2 remedial scheme aims to give the minority
population a real opportunity to elect a preferred candidate—
not a minority candidate. “Racial” voting, however, is a
reasonable concern. But this concern can be countered. For
instance, recognizing that the new system will change the
172

Erick Erickson, Add Federal Judge Stephen Robinson to the “Must
Impeach” List, REDSTATE (June 16, 2010, 9:26 AM), http://www.redstate.com/erick/
2010/06/16/add-federal-judge-stephen-robinson-to-the-must-impeach-list.
173
Bob Unruh, 1-Man, 6-Vote Racial Plan Used to Choose Board’s 1st Minority,
WORLDNETDAILY (Aug. 8, 2010, 10:18 PM), http://www.wnd.com/?pageID=188173.
174
Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
175
Michael Goodwin, Dave: To Bankruptcy—& Beyond!, N.Y. POST, June 20, 2010,
available
at
http://pagesixsixsix.com/f/print/news/local/dave_to_bankruptcy_beyond_
mFBhlVG1XBJj1DNCzBHWBJ.
176
Id.
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status quo—which has been deemed to constitute racial bloc
voting already—is meant to ameliorate racial voting, not breed
it.177 Further, as Mulroy notes in describing the “selfdistrict[ing]”
principles
of
alternative
systems,
“[v]oters . . . have complete freedom to identify what interests
and issues are most germane to them, and vote accordingly for
any candidate(s) (of any race), anywhere in the jurisdiction,
perceived to represent those concerns.”178
Second, the claim about illegal aliens’ controlling the
vote is without merit here. In Port Chester, the court did
discuss the total population (both citizens and noncitizens), the
voting age population (VAP), and the citizen voting age
population (CVAP) of Hispanics in its liability analysis, but
placed an emphasis on CVAP in finding that the minoritymajority district of Hispanics was sufficiently large and
geographically compact enough to show a real opportunity to
elect.179 However, Gheen’s is an argument that has been used in
other cases. Because “[t]he Constitution requires inclusion of
all inhabitants in the apportionment base for congressional
districts but does not specify procedures for drawing local
districts or deciding who must be included,” decisions about
whether to draw lines according to total population, VAP, or
CVAP has been the focal point of contention in recent years.180
But the first prong of Gingles, which includes the benchmark
districts that are drawn during the liability phase of a section 2
claim, have usually been interpreted by the courts as
embracing CVAP.181 The Port Chester district that was used as
a benchmark conforms to this standard.
Regarding the implementation of the system, the Post
noted that “[t]axpayers were robbed, with the town spending
$300,000 on the process and maybe $1 million in legal fees—all
for an election in which 3,000 people voted. The turnout was
177

See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 352-53.
Id. at 354.
179
See United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 421-23
(S.D.N.Y. 2010).
180
Carl E. Goldfarb, Note, Allocating the Local Apportionment Pie: What Portion
for Resident Aliens?, 104 YALE L.J. 1441, 1456 (1995); Persily, supra note 53, at 778. For
other districting purposes, Goldfarb argued that “excluding noncitizens from the
apportionment base would impose greater hardships on a community,” in that the
district’s resources would likely be more swiftly depleted. Goldfarb, supra, at 1455. Many
critics of districting that relies on total population or VAP of a minority group also neglect
to recognize that legal aliens, who cannot vote, “partake of life in the community just as
much as citizens, paying all taxes and drawing on all community services.” Id. at 1456.
181
See text supra note 53.
178
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about twenty-five percent of registered voters, the same as in
previous elections. But cheer up: A Latino candidate won.”182
Even some of the Village’s voters expressed unease:
“That was very strange. . . . I’m not sure I liked it. All my life,
I’ve heard, ‘one man, one vote,’” said Arthur Furano, a Village
resident.183 This sort of reaction is not at all unique with the
implementation of alternative voting practices. In an empirical
study of communities in which cumulative voting was
implemented, Richard H. Pildes and Kristen A. Donoghue
found that cumulative voting was disliked for just this
reason—the “widely shared view that cumulative voting was
undemocratic and unconstitutional because it violated the one
person, one vote principle.”184 But the claim attacking the
constitutionality of the cumulative voting system on “one
person, one vote” grounds is without merit.185 In another
community where cumulative voting was implemented in 1988,
one individual recalled,
When the idea was first proposed, as far as the public reaction, we
thought it was a joke, because the idea that one person could vote
seven times in one particular race was just really unheard of at that
time, and many people thought it was just something they were
grasping at straws kind of a thing, and it would not ever come into
effect here. Once it became the law under the settlement of this court
case, a lot of people still didn’t believe it.186

Joseph Kenner, a Village Trustee who voted to appeal
the Port Chester Court’s vote-dilution ruling, describes the new
system as “a little unusual.”187 Kenner would like to see the
district court’s decision overturned.188 He would also like to see
182

Goodwin, supra note 175.
See Fitzgerald, supra note 126.
184
Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 282.
185
Id. While perhaps understandable because of the unusualness of the
cumulative voting system, these sentiments are not properly placed.
183

The principle of one person, one vote now viewed as so ‘fundamental’ to
democratic government was not, of course, constitutionally established until
1964. Moreover, cumulative voting does not violate the principle of one person,
one vote; as long as each person has equal voting power, the formal number of
votes cast is irrelevant to the equal-protection concerns embodied in the one
person, one vote doctrine.
Id.
186

Id. at 270 (quoting Sue Smith, a Republican voted onto the Board of
Education in Chilton County under a cumulative voting electoral process).
187
Telephone Interview with Joseph Kenner, Vill. of Port Chester Tr. (Mar.
28, 2011).
188
Id.
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a return to the old system that Port Chester had in place—an
at-large, multimember voting scheme; he asserts that
candidates should be expected to garner as many votes as
possible in more traditional ways, like going door-to-door,
building natural coalitions with voters, and holding candidate
forums.189 The new scheme, he says, was also very costly.190 He
notes that one current issue with the Village residents’
reception of the system could be that the villagers associate the
voting scheme aspect with the section 2 lawsuit liability aspect,
which he believes carries a “stigma.”191 Kenner explains that
voters have certainly expressed tremendous outrage over the
court’s order, which directed Port Chester to change its voting
system.192 The outrage also stems from the fact that this
unusual system was implemented to achieve a desired
outcome—one that, in this case, is based on race.193
But Kenner also asserts that, of the options available at
the remedy phase in the district court, cumulative voting was
truly the best for the Village.194 Due to the small geographic
area, the relative geographic dispersion of Hispanics within the
Village, and a districting system’s potential to “crack” other
cohesive groups, Kenner believes that a districting system
would be impractical.195 One of Kenner’s main concerns with the
new system is the elimination of staggered terms, which was
ordered by the court as necessary in order for the Hispanic
population to meet the threshold of exclusion. Voting for all six
Board seats concurrently means that, during any given
election, all seats can be replaced with a set of newcomers,
eviscerating institutional knowledge.196 Kenner also noted that
it is too soon to tell whether the Board’s partisan diversity will
work to hamstring any Village initiatives; but no group on the
Board holds an absolute majority.197
With this kind of misunderstanding and general unease,
it is necessary for the DOJ to proffer its position regarding
alternative voting systems.

189
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IS CUMULATIVE VOTING A VIABLE REMEDIAL SCHEME
FOR SECTION 2 VIOLATIONS?

As mentioned, the DOJ has never actively sought
cumulative voting as a remedy for a section 2 violation. But the
DOJ’s arguments in the Port Chester case can be extrapolated
to glean a wider perspective of the DOJ’s position. The DOJ
required an in-depth educational program in the Village
because cumulative voting is complex and has broad strategic
implications. The DOJ may require other conditions to ensure
that cumulative voting comports with the mandates of section 2
and the Voting Rights Act. Section 5 provides some indication.
A.

The Interplay Between Sections 2 and 5: What the DOJ
Might Seek Under a Cumulative Voting System

In its opposition to Port Chester’s proposed remedy of
cumulative voting, the DOJ admonished FairVote, amicus for
the Village’s proposed remedy, for drawing parallels between
the DOJ’s section 5 and section 2 positions.198 Steven J. Mulroy
has likewise drawn comparisons between the two Voting
Rights Act sections, looking to section 5 preclearance objections
in an effort to glean what kinds of remedial schemes might be
appropriate under section 2.199 Section 5 provides that certain
jurisdictions that are “covered” must obtain federal approval—
i.e., preclearance—from the Attorney General before changing
any of their voting procedures.200 Covered jurisdictions are those
with particularly discriminatory voting histories.201 To be
precleared by the Attorney General, a “covered jurisdiction[]
must demonstrate that electoral changes are discriminatory
neither in purpose nor in effect, a standard the Supreme Court
interpreted to require a showing that the changes do not
worsen, or cause retrogression to, existing opportunities for
202
The covered
political participation by minority voters.”
198

Memorandum of Law of the United States of America in Support of
Plaintiffs’ Joint Proposed Remedial Plan, supra note 95, at 20 (“FairVote also
improperly conflates election schemes that the Department has not objected to in the
preclearance process versus remedies that it has endorsed.”).
199
See, e.g., Mulroy, Full Representation, supra note 14.
200
42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (2006). See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism
and the Interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 857, 868 (2011)
[hereinafter Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism].
201
Fuentes-Rohwer, Judicial Activism, supra note 200, at 868.
202
Ellen Katz, Not Like the South? Regional Variation and Political
Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT: REAUTHORIZATION
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jurisdiction must submit any proposed voting-system change to
the Attorney General, who “may interpose an objection by
informing the jurisdiction of the decision no later than 60 days
after a voting change has been submitted.”203
There is undoubtedly interplay between section 5 and
section 2. Interestingly, it was a section 5 case—Allen v. State
Board of Elections—that first allowed vote dilution challenges
under the Voting Rights Act.204 In that case, the Supreme Court
noted that certain registration processes might not just deny
access to the ballot, but might also dilute minority votes.205
Witnesses before Congress have also testified that “‘[s]ection 2
would be inadequate without [s]ection 5 to enforce it.’”206 Indeed,
“[s]ection 5 operates to protect the gains that plaintiffs obtain
through section 2 litigation.”207 Port Chester, for example, is
subject to preclearance requirements now that the litigation is
over.208 And if an agreed upon remedial plan is not implemented
correctly, section 5 ensures that the plan will work going
forward.209 Also similar to section 5, section 2 lets states choose
their own method of complying with the Voting Rights Act.210
Because of the similarities between sections 2 and 5, an
examination of the DOJ’s administrative preclearance
determinations might therefore reveal the DOJ’s position on

2006: PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRACY, PARTICIPATION, AND POWER 183, 190 (Ana
Henderson ed., 2007).
203
See Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 19.
204
See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (“The right to
vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition
on casting a ballot.”).
205
Id.
206
Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting
Rights Act: How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate? 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 385, 416 (2008) (citing Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, and Purpose:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 146 (2006) [hereinafter Section 5 Hearing] (statement of Anita Earls,
Director, Advocacy, University of North Carolina School of Law)).
207
Id. (quoting Section 5 Hearing, supra note 206, at 145 (statement of Anita
Earls, Director, Advocacy, University of North Carolina School of Law)).
208
Consent Decree, supra note 123, ¶¶ 9, 11. Port Chester is subject to prior
clearance under section 3(a) of the Voting Rights Act, which is largely identical to
section 5. Id; compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (2006) (section 3(a)), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973(c) (2006) (section 5).
209
Clarke, supra note 206, at 416 (citing Voting Rights Act: An Examination of the
Scope and Criteria for Coverage Under the Special Provisions of the Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 34 (2005)
(statement of Jose Garza, Counsel for the League of United Latin American Citizens)).
210
Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 482 (2003) (“Section 5 gives States the
flexibility to choose one theory of effective representation over the other.”).
OF
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alternative voting systems, like cumulative voting.211
Evaluating the only cumulative voting preclearance objection
from the Attorney General that existed in 1995, Steven J.
Mulroy found that a DOJ investigation revealed no serious
effort in the community to “solicit the views of the minority
community, to investigate whether the minority community
had a complete understanding of the cumulative voting system,
or to provide bilingual education to the minority community
regarding the new system.”212 Another objection rejected
cumulative voting because the system would use “numbered
posts,”213 which can also have a dilutive effect.214 Since then,
another letter of objection from the Attorney General shows
that a district wished to change from its single-member
districting scheme to cumulative voting with staggered terms.215
In its analysis, the DOJ noted that the district’s Hispanic
population, which had been successful under the seven singlemember districting scheme to elect school board officials, would
be unlikely to meet the threshold of exclusion.216
These objections are telling in that they evince what the
DOJ requires when implementing a cumulative voting system:
namely, that the minority population can, in fact, meet the
threshold of exclusion, and that the plan for education about
the system prior to implementation is comprehensive.
But there are notable distinctions between section 2 and
section 5, which likely explain why the DOJ admonishes
comparison of its positions regarding one or the other section.
Section 2 concerns the opportunity of a minority group to elect
its preferred representative, while section 5 merely asks
whether a change has the effect of denying or abridging the
right to vote. Furthermore, “[s]cholars and Supreme Court
[J]ustices have begun to observe ‘discord and inconsistency’
211

See Mulroy, Full Representation, supra note 14.
Id. Based on these factors, the Attorney General objected to a change in
voting scheme in Cochran County, Texas, from its five-member city council elected
under a traditional at-large system by plurality vote to cumulative voting on
September 12, 1994. Id.
213
See Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 8.
“Numbered Posts” are “[p]ositions on a city council or school board, somewhat similar
to designated areas, where candidates run from a particular ‘post’ but still have to be
elected at-large. Some numbered posts require that the candidate be a resident of a
particular geographical area.” Glossary, supra note 10.
214
See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 888 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
215
Letter from Assistant Att’y Gen. to Haskell Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. (Sept.
24, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/pdfs/l_092401.pdf.
216
Id.
212
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between the antidilution goal of [s]ection 2 and the
antiretrogression goal of [s]ection 5.”217 Also, section 2 is
permanent, while section 5 will sunset in 2031.218 Therefore, to
the extent that section 5 positions can elucidate the DOJ’s
stance regarding section 2, they reveal little more than does
the Port Chester consent decree: the DOJ requires community
education because of the strategic nature of cumulative voting
and the potential for community confusion, and the threshold
of exclusion must be met generously.
The DOJ’s strong preference for single-member districts
still stands in the way of full support for cumulative voting.
But, after Bartlett, the preference for single-member districts
should again be questioned.
B.

The Presumption of Single-Member Districts: Why the
DOJ Advocates for Them, Why They Should Again Be
Questioned, and Whether They Are Legally Replaceable

As discussed, in Voting Rights Act cases like Port
Chester, the DOJ typically argues that there is a heavy
presumption in favor of single-member districts to remedy
section 2 violations. The Port Chester Court, however, did not
address this proposition in its opinion. This is likely because
the court did not have to reach the question—the Village’s
proposed remedy was factually and legally defensible according
to the court, and so it paid due deference to the legislature.219 As
we have seen, single-member districts have in fact been the
preferred benchmark for measuring Voting Rights Act
violations and for remedying impermissible vote dilution.220 But,
for reasons explained below—especially in light of Bartlett—
presumptions of single-member districts must once again be
questioned, and the DOJ must evaluate whether other systems
might serve as permissible and more beneficial remedies.

217

Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There is a
fundamental flaw . . . in any scheme in which the Department of Justice is permitted or
directed to encourage or ratify a course of unconstitutional conduct in order to find
compliance with a statutory directive.”). Here, Justice Kennedy recognizes the tension
between race-motivated districting and the prevalent use of this kind of line drawing to
stave off vote dilution; see also Absoch et al., supra note 49, at 107.
218
See Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, supra note 19.
219
See, e.g., Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1994) (“Once a
violation of [section] 2 of the Voting Rights Act has been established, a district court should
give the appropriate legislative body the first opportunity to devise a remedial plan.”).
220
See supra Part I.B.
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1. Critiques of Single-Member Districts as the
Traditional Cure
Single-member districts are typically implemented as a
cure for at-large, “winner-take-all” election practices.221
However, the favoring of single-member districts can be
criticized for a number of reasons. First, as the Supreme Court
noted in Gingles, the multimember, at-large form was not
“responsible for minority voters’ inability to elect its
candidates”; rather, it was the winner-take-all practice in place
within the at-large district that diluted the minority vote.222
Thus, in thinking about the methodology of the electoral
process in an at-large system, as opposed to the at-large system
itself, cumulative voting could be an effective remedy. A
cumulative voting system that retains a multimember district,
but changes the method by which governmental seats are
elected, is just as preferable as single-member districts,
provided that the scheme affords the minority the potential to
elect representatives articulated in Gingles.223 Theoretically,
this kind of representation can be achieved whenever the
threshold of exclusion is exceeded. The rule that at-large
systems should be changed completely because the winnertake-all nature diluted votes previously should not apply to
cumulative voting, because cumulative voting is specifically
“designed to enhance minority political opportunity.”224 While
alternative voting schemes like cumulative voting are still atlarge, they are not winner-take-all. And while the Gingles
Court attacked a multimember system, multimember systems
are not necessarily invidious.225 Single-member districts were
not even prevalent until 1842, when Congress decided that the
House of Representatives should be elected from single-

221

See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 338, 362 (“An oft-repeated
principle in voting rights cases is that single-member districts are ‘strongly preferred’
to at-large plans for court-ordered . . . remedies.”).
222
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 & n.17 (1986); see also Karlan,
supra note 63, at 235-36.
223
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17; see also Karlan, supra note 63, at 235.
224
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 362-63 (discussing the fact
that multimember district criticism stems from their “winner-take-all” nature).
225
Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 897 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]here
is no principle inherent in our constitutional system, or even in the history of the
Nation’s electoral practices, that makes single-member districts the ‘proper’
mechanism for electing representatives to governmental bodies or for giving ‘undiluted’
effect to the votes of a numerical minority.”).
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member districts.226 While multimember districts are attacked
under section 2, they are still part and parcel with the
American system of government.227
Second, as mentioned, single-member districts that
create geographic compactness of minorities became
ultrasensitive to constitutional attack under the Equal
Protection Clause.228 In Port Chester, the Village identified the
Shaw line of cases as a potential concern.229 The Shaw cases
make the remedy of cumulative voting seem attractive as a
remedial measure because cumulative voting does not require
district drawing on the basis of race, thus avoiding the risk of
an equal-protection violation. The Port Chester Court noted
favorably, too, that a cumulative voting plan would obviate
concerns of racial gerrymandering.230 Especially now that
Bartlett has foreclosed the possibility of remedying voter
dilution with coalitional or crossover districts, courts should
again consider cumulative voting and other alternative voting
systems as replacements for single-member districts to
eradicate the risks of racial gerrymandering. But there may be
other factors that give a kind of “presumptive rightness” to
single-member districts that other alternative systems do not
enjoy—like the question of the liability-remedy relationship.
2. The Test for Liability and Its Relation to Remedy:
Are Single-Member Districts Legally Replaceable?
Single-member districts have carried a heavy
presumption in section 2 cases likely because of Gingles.
Although the first Gingles precondition truly speaks to the
dilution problem and potential violation, it also contemplates a
remedy.231 The first Gingles factor forces the plaintiff to show
that the grievance can be remedied by demonstrating that
there is a problem with the current voting scheme, and that the
226

Id. at 898.
Id.
228
See, e.g., Pildes & Donoghue, supra note 42, at 241 (“Supreme Court
decisions . . . cast substantial . . . doubt on the continued constitutionality of raceconscious districting.”).
229
Defendant’s Pre-Hearing Remedy Brief, supra note 98, at 10.
230
United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 453
(“[C]umulative voting and alternative voting schemes have received focus precisely
because they avoid the Shaw problem that plagued drawing single-member districts.”
(citing Jason Kirksey, et al., Shaw v. Reno and the New Election Systems: The
Cumulative Voting Alternative, VOTING RIGHTS REV. 10 (1995))).
231
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986).
227
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scheme can be rectified with another scheme—hence, that
dilution exists.232 Indeed, the first Gingles precondition calls on
the plaintiff to establish that there is an injury and to show
that his injury can be redressed.233 This precondition requires
demonstrating that a dilutive plan—like an at-large winnertake-all system—injures the section 2 plaintiffs by failing to
draw an available remedial district that would give those
plaintiffs a chance to elect their chosen candidate.
Accordingly, the political subdivision at issue must have
a minority group that is “sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district.”234
Therefore, to show injury, the section 2 plaintiff must come
forward with a proposed plan that shows the minority group
can constitute a majority in a single-member district. In
Bartlett, the Supreme Court finally determined what this
majority constituted for the sake of the geographical
“compactness” requirement: the minority population must be
fifty percent or more of VAP or CVAP in a given district.235
Drawing these types of districts as a remedy to pass the
first Gingles precondition is necessary, and courts have
struggled with establishing a reasonable alternative practice as
a benchmark against which to measure the existing voting
practice.236 These decisions, however, ultimately concluded that
the district system is the benchmark.237 Even in Port Chester,
the expert who aided the DOJ in assessing the districts noted
that “showing that Hispanics represent a majority of CVAP in
a single member district is a typical method for arguing that
there is an ability to elect [the minority’s candidate of
choice].”238 Each of the hypothetical districts used by the DOJ in
Port Chester did just that. In one plan, the total CVAP of
Hispanics in one district was 50.51 percent; in the other, the

232

Id.
Id. at 50-51 & n.17 (1986).
234
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
235
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1246 (2009) (noting that section 2
requires first, the creation of a “majority-minority” district, in which a minority group
composes a numerical of fifty percent or more of the voting-age population, and second,
that a court is not required to draw crossover districts according to section 2).
236
See, e.g., Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 881 (1994).
237
See Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1247 (“To the extent there is any doubt whether
[section] 2 calls for the majority-minority rule, we resolve that doubt by avoiding
serious constitutional concerns under the Equal Protection Clause.”).
238
United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411, 425 & n.10
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
233
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total CVAP of Hispanics was 56.27 percent in the opportunityto-elect district.239
Therefore, in Port Chester, while the remedy was
cumulative voting, a cumulative voting system was not used
during the liability phase to show that the minority group had
a potential to elect. It seems counterintuitive that the remedy
used to show that a political subdivision has violated section
2—the same remedy that shows that a non-dilutive scheme is
possible—would not be implemented to cure the violation after
liability was determined.
a. The Unlikelihood That the Gingles Benchmark Will
Change
It seems unlikely that the first Gingles precondition will
be reconstructed to allow for new benchmarks. In Voinovich v.
Quilter, the Supreme Court noted that, to allow “atypical” claims
under section 2, like crossover district claims, the first Gingles
requirement “would have to be modified or eliminated,”
presumably because the “compactness” requirement would not be
at issue.240 The Court recently recognized this dilemma in Bartlett
v. Strickland, where it refused to allow crossover districts to
constitute a benchmark for the first Gingles precondition.241
Those in favor of cumulative voting have suggested that,
if cumulative voting was the remedy of choice, another test
should supplant the typical benchmark of drawing singlemember districts for elections: the “threshold of exclusion” test.
For example, Steven J. Mulroy has argued that a narrow view
of the first Gingles prong, limiting the benchmark to singlemember districts, is unjustified.242 His argument turns on the
language of the first Gingles precondition, which requires that
the minority group has the “potential to elect representatives”
239

Id. at 425. In Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. 1231, the Supreme Court ruled
definitively that in order to meet the first Gingles precondition, the proposed district
must comprise more than fifty percent VAP (or CVAP) of the district’s population.
While Port Chester was decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Bartlett, the
majority-minority district proposed by the DOJ—and used to determined liability—
pass muster under Bartlett.
240
See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993) (noting the first Gingles
requirement “would have to be modified or eliminated” to allow crossover-district claims).
241
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1237.
242
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 369. Mulroy asserts that, when
the Supreme Court devised the first Gingles precondition, it was not contemplating an
alternative voting system, which is why the compactness requirement centers around
single-member districts. But he argues this should not foreclose alternative voting
systems from applying to the first Gingles precondition. Id. at 363-64.
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in the absence of the challenged structure or practice.243
Focusing on the “potential to elect” portion of this precondition,
Mulroy determined that the compactness portion need not be
met.244 Rather, Mulroy urged for a substitute benchmark with a
“threshold of exclusion” prong, which would afford minority
voters the same opportunity—or “potential”—to elect their
preferred candidate.245 In essence, Mulroy asserted that the first
Gingles precondition was more flexible than it appeared or
than it had been construed by the courts.246 But the Supreme
Court has never framed the requirement as anything other
than a majority-minority rule.
There are difficulties with proposing a new Gingles
benchmark for the first precondition to establish liability. First,
as a practical matter, the current single-member district
benchmark test of Gingles is straightforward. Mulroy
acknowledged this.247 The plaintiff presents a “map of an
illustrative majority-minority district to demonstrate the first
Gingles prong of ‘compactness,’” and a court can rule easily on
whether the first precondition is met.248 But, as Mulroy also
noted, the threshold of exclusion benchmark is a simplistic
formula to apply, too.249 This is crucial—the Bartlett Court
recognized the importance of a clear, numerical rule (fifty
percent VAP/CVAP) when it struck down the potential of a
legally-mandated crossover district.250 One large problem with
the idea of judicially enforceable crossover districts was the
243

See id. at 364 (emphasis added).
See id. at 368.
245
See id. at 369.
246
See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158 (1993) (noting that the
Gingles requirements “cannot be applied mechanically and without regard to the
nature of the claim”).
247
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 345.
248
Id. Mulroy recognizes that an idea to replace the Gingles compactness
requirement would be met with criticism because the requirement “is an objective,
easily quantifiable, ‘bright line’ standard which allows for easy judicial
implementation.” Id. at 369.
249
Id. at 370-71 (“All that is needed to be known is the minority’s percentage
of the jurisdiction’s population, the number of seats on the governing body in question,
and the type of alternative electoral system requested in the plaintiffs’ complaint. From
these three facts one would be able to calculate whether the plaintiff can make out a
prima facie case of ‘potential to elect,’ as understood in Gingles.”).
250
Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231, 1245 (2009) (“Unlike any of the
standards proposed to allow crossover-district claims, the majority-minority rule relies
on an objective, numerical test: Do minorities make up more than 50 percent of the
voting-age population in the relevant geographic area? That rule provides
straightforward guidance to courts and to those officials charged with drawing district
lines to comply with [section] 2.”).
244
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necessity of the courts to engage in political questioning.251
Cumulative voting, by contrast, does not demand that the
courts delve into politics or line-drawing. Rather, it applies a
simple formula to determine the remedy. Therefore, it, too, is a
desirable standard for the judiciary.
But to the extent that the “benchmark” for determining
the sufficiency of the first Gingles precondition was never very
exact—and thus perhaps open to interpretation—that has since
changed after Bartlett. There was no precise bar by which to
measure the exactitude of what constituted a majority within a
given majority-minority district, and so the “threshold of
exclusion” benchmark might have actually been a cleaner,
more precise method by which to determine ability to elect.
Bartlett, however, established a clear numerical threshold
defining the “majority” under the first Gingles factor; in order
for the majority-minority population to avail itself of an
opportunity to elect its candidate of choice in section 2
challenge, it must show it can constitute at least fifty percent of
VAP/CVAP in a drawn district.252 Furthermore, the Court
expressly noted in Bartlett that “[a]llowing crossover-district
claims would require us to revise and reformulate the Gingles
threshold inquiry that has been the baseline of our [section] 2
jurisprudence.”253 Indeed, while the refusal to reformulate the
first Gingles precondition rested on the particular facts of
Bartlett, it is telling in that the Court considers any change to
Gingles’ preconditions to be offensive to stare decisis—thus, the
first precondition, according to the Court, is not as flexible as
once thought.254
The argument might be made, however, that Bartlett
need not foreclose completely the idea that single-member
districts can be replaced by the threshold of exclusion within
251

Id. at 1244 (noting that if section 2 required crossover districts, the
judiciary would be “in the untenable position of predicting many political variables and
tying them to race-based assumptions”).
252
Id. at 1246 (noting that only a district with a minority population of more
than fifty percent of the VAP/CVAP can provide a remedy to minority voters under
section 2). It is perhaps worth noting that, while the Bartlett decision was rendered after
the Port Chester case was decided, the majority-minority district in Port Chester proposed
by the DOJ did, in fact, have both VAP and CVAP voting populations of over fifty percent.
Mulroy argued that a minority population in a given subdivision could have a potential to
elect its preferred candidate under the threshold of exclusion if the minority population
was too geographically dispersed for the legislature draw a district with more than fifty
percent minority VAP/CVAP. Mulroy, Alternative Ways Out, supra note 118, at 1881.
Bartlett requires such a district be drawn for the first Gingles precondition.
253
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1244.
254
See generally McLoughlin, supra note 49.
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the first Gingles prong. As Mulroy has argued in the past,
“[w]here the plaintiffs do not challenge the use of at-large
elections per se, but instead some discrete feature of the
particular at-large system being used, a different analysis
obtains.”255 The challenge might be “to such electoral features as
majority vote . . . [or] staggered term[] requirements,” which do
not require single-member districts absolutely.256 Moreover,
attaching the threshold of exclusion as a benchmark for the
first Gingles precondition would not disrupt the other two
Gingles preconditions.257 The Bartlett Court, in dicta, made a
point of noting that using crossover districts as a benchmark
within the first Gingles prong could cause tension with the
third necessary Gingles precondition—that the white majority
votes as a bloc.258 The threshold of exclusion, on the other hand,
would not produce such a tension, and the third Gingles prong
would still need to be met.
Even if there exists the possibility that the threshold of
exclusion could be used to replace the districting benchmark of
the first Gingles prong, though, it still seems unlikely that the
Court would adopt the threshold of exclusion as a replacement
for the precise standard that the Bartlett Court set forth.
b. Cumulative Voting as a Judicially Imposed Remedy
While Bartlett might have defined an exact numerical
for the purposes of liability under the first Gingles
precondition, cumulative voting should still constitute a
judicially enforceable and imposed remedial measure when the
political subdivision at issue desires it. Indeed, after Bartlett, a
political subdivision must take the first step of proving liability
by showing potential majority-minority districts with a
minority VAP/CVAP of more than fifty percent. Thereafter,
courts should adopt the view—as the Port Chester Court did—
that the remedy and the benchmark need not be related. In
this sense, the first Gingles precondition requires the existence
only of a hypothetical benchmark for the purpose of measuring
255

Mulroy, supra note 12, at 365.
Id. at 355-56.
257
Id. at 373 (noting that “plaintiffs would still have to prove racial bloc voting”).
258
Bartlett, 129 S. Ct. at 1244 (“Mandatory recognition of claims in which
success for a minority depends upon crossover majority voters would create serious
tension with the third Gingles requirement that the majority votes as a bloc to defeat
minority-preferred candidates.”).
256
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vote dilution, not an actual remedy, so the remedy should be
viewed as a separate entity. In Holder v. Hall, Justice
O’Connor articulated the difference between the two and
explained that an
alternative benchmark is often self-evident. In a challenge to a
multi-member at-large system, for example, a court may compare it
to a system of multiple single-member districts. Though there may
be disagreements about the precise appropriate alternative practice
in these cases, . . . there are at least some objectively determinable
constraints on the dilution inquiry.259

In other words, the first two preconditions merely
contemplate an objective basis used to assess the votedilution inquiry; they do not have to be seen as
contemplating a remedy or the “precise appropriate
alternative practice” that will ultimately be implemented.260
There are, of course, cases that suggest a different
interpretation, even diametrically opposed to the notion that
one can separate the Gingles benchmark requirement from a
remedial plan. On a rudimentary level, “any federal decree
must be a tailored remedial response to illegality.”261 On its
face, an understanding of this proposition tells us that the
benchmark that determined illegality should be the benchmark
used to cure that illegality. Other courts construe the
benchmark dilemma in a similar manner. “The inquiries into
remedy and liability . . . cannot be separated: A district court
must determine as part of the Gingles threshold inquiry
whether it can fashion a permissible remedy in the particular
context of the challenged system.”262
But if the first Gingles benchmark is inextricably linked
to the remedy imposed, then, after Bartlett, the only plans
political subdivisions could employ as remedial measures
would be single-member districts with a minority VAP/CVAP of
more than fifty percent. The potential foreclosure of alternative
259

Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 888 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
See Mulroy, The Way Out, supra note 12, at 364 (citing SCLC v. Sessions,
56 F.3d 1281, 1302 (11th Cir. 1995) (Hatchett, J., dissenting)) (“Under this analysis, a
plaintiff who can satisfy the compactness requirement with an illustrative district (as
well as the other Gingles preconditions and Senate factors) can potentially obtain an
alternative system as relief.”).
261
LULAC v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 847 (5th Cir. 1993).
262
Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494, 1530-31 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc); see also
Cottier v. City of Martin, 604 F.3d 553, 571 (8th Cir. 2010) (Smith, J., dissenting)
(finding that “Bartlett’s explanation of the majority-minority rule with regard to
liability directly affects the imposition of a [section] 2 remedy, as issues of liability and
remedy are inextricably intertwined”).
260
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voting systems again implicates Shaw and equal-protection
violations. The Supreme Court—which has continually
expressed its disdain for race-conscious line-drawing—would be
better served by allowing for alternative voting practices as
cures, so long as the plaintiffs in these cases meet all of the
requirements of a vote-dilution claim at the liability phase, at
least so long as the defendant jurisdiction desires the
alternative system. The mandate, expressed by federal circuit
courts of appeals, that the defendant political subdivision’s
remedial plan should prevail whenever possible in section 2
cases263 should trump any inkling that the liability benchmark
and the remedial plan need be identical. This was precisely the
case in Port Chester. At that juncture, after liability has been
proved with district drawing and a numerical majority, the
plaintiff has proved an opportunity to elect. If a section 2
violation is then found, the qualities of cumulative voting that
are most appealing—its easily applied numerical standard (the
threshold of exclusion) and its imperviousness to an equalprotection attack—are ideal for the remedy stage. Therefore,
while some circuit courts of appeals have determined that
liability and remedy are inextricably linked in section 2 cases,
the Supreme Court has not.264 The courts would be better
served, if restricted to numerical single-member districts in
determining liability under Bartlett and Gingles, to
contemplate less race-conscious remedies like cumulative
voting. This is why it is imperative for the DOJ to define some
initial standards concerning the circumstances under which
cumulative voting can be used as a remedial measure.
IV.

PROPOSAL

The DOJ must establish clear guidelines regarding the
implementation of cumulative voting. In light of the recent
Bartlett decision and the national attention the Port Chester
case has received, it is an optimal time for the DOJ to define
the circumstances under which cumulative voting should be
considered an appropriate remedy for a section 2 violation.
Undoubtedly, the DOJ should provide guidance about
the educational program that should be implemented along
with the cumulative voting system, which should be
263

See, e.g., Cane v. Worcester Cnty., 35 F.3d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1994).
Cottier, 604 F.3d at 570-71 (“Admittedly, Bartlett concerned only the
liability stage of a [section] 2 case, not the remedial stage.”).
264
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comprehensive. This is evidenced by the all-inclusive
educational program the DOJ demanded in Port Chester, along
with notes in the DOJ’s preclearance objection letters and
stances in recent litigation.265 The DOJ should also ensure it
outlines precise measures that must be taken by bilingual
communities (like Port Chester), which must ensure that
populations of non-English speaking voters receive the
attention and education necessary to understand the system—
which, of course, is more complex than other voting systems.
The DOJ might consider devising its own educational manual
about cumulative voting, so that voters are aware that it is
currently a system in use in a number of jurisdictions, and so
that voters can become familiar with alternative voting
systems uniformly. Residents in political subdivisions where
cumulative voting is implemented should be given sufficient
information about applicable voting strategies. Moreover, the
DOJ should also seek—most of all—to rid constituents of faulty
notions: that cumulative voting violates the “one man, one
vote” requirement, or that cumulative voting constitutes
impermissible proportional representation.266 This education
would not be done in vain; where the system has been
implemented, voters seem to understand the process.267
The DOJ should communicate aptly that the political
subdivision endeavoring to implement the system should have
a healthy fiscal budget. The hefty educational plan creates real
costs, and the DOJ should asses the political subdivision’s
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See, e.g., Mulroy, Full Representation, supra note 14 (“[M]ost important,
consideration of any proposed implementation of [cumulative voting] must involve an
analysis of the political sophistication of the local minority community and the
likelihood of that community employing the necessary strategic voting. Where these
factors are lacking, the cumulative . . . vote remed[y] will be viewed, understandably,
as ineffective.”); see also U.S. Memorandum in Opposition to Euclid City Sch. Dist.,
supra note 69, at 4 n.4 (“The United States believes the . . . cumulative voting proposal
also fails because it does not provide an adequate plan to educate the voters or to
implement the voting scheme.”).
266
See, e.g., Slatky, supra note 12.
267
See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 59, at 366 (“Fifty-seven local governments
used cumulative voting as of 1997. The continued use of these methods for casting
ballots provides strong evidence that they are not too complicated for the electorate.”).
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capacity to launch the new system.268 For example, Port Chester
spent roughly $300,000 on its implementation procedures.269
The DOJ should also pronounce what it believes are the
most advantageous size and demographic makeup of a political
subdivision endeavoring to implement the system. Cumulative
voting has most often been used in smaller political subdivisions,
like school boards. Because of the more complicated nature of
the system, and because cumulative voting requires voters to
vote strategically—“plumping” their votes for a given candidate,
or aggregating votes with others within their community—
implementation of the system in a large subdivision could suffer,
at least where vote dilution is the violation.270
Finally, the DOJ should be clear about the numerical
figures it wants the political subdivision to use when
calculating the threshold of exclusion, so that the minority
voters in the district have a real “potential to elect” their
preferred candidate. For example, in a recent section 2 case,
the DOJ noted that the threshold of exclusion, as it relates to
the real opportunity to elect, should be calculated based on the
total electorate that actually showed up to the polls.271 The DOJ
wanted the number assigned to the minority voting population
to reflect historical data.272 The court, however, used a different
figure: it assumed as a starting point for threshold of exclusion
analysis that minority voters would go to the polls at twothirds the rate of non-minority voters.273 Therefore, the DOJ
should ensure that, when calculating the threshold of
exclusion, the minority population will have an actual, realistic
opportunity to elect its preferred candidate.
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A Port Chester Village spokesman noted, “We put so much emphasis on
education—we may have spent $100 a voter—because we knew it would be critical to
success . . . . [T]he next community can point to Port Chester and say ‘That’s how it’s
done.’” Jim Fitzgerald, One Man, Six Votes: Port Chester Experiment Could Expand,
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CONCLUSION
Remedial schemes for section 2 violations are again in
limbo after Bartlett. The Department of Justice should be more
elastic in its acceptance of alternative voting schemes, and
should be clearer about its position regarding cumulative
voting and other alternative voting schemes. From the DOJ’s
litigation strategy in Port Chester, we know successful
implementations require, at the very least, education and
assurance that the minority voters will have the potential to
elect a seat once the remedial scheme is up and running.
Courts are continually “required to confront a number of
complex and essentially political questions in assessing claims
of vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act.”274 The “central
difficulty” is often “determining a point of comparison against
which dilution can be measured.”275 Perhaps, in the end, “[t]he
matters the Court has set out to resolve in vote dilution cases
are questions of political philosophy, not questions of law. As
such, they are not readily subjected to any judicially
manageable standards that can guide courts in attempting to
select between competing theories.”276 Rather, the parameters
for these political questions, and of alternative electoral
systems, should be established by the DOJ, so that political
subdivisions have a sense of how to best govern their citizens,
and afford as many as possible a fair say in representation.
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